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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
26 February 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Soviet Draft Nonaggression Treaty

1. The draft NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty introduced by Soviet delegate Kuznetsov at Geneva on 20 February contains no significant departures from the formula the USSR has been promoting since 1955. It pledges the signatories to refrain from aggression, the threat of force, or the use of force by any means incompatible with the UN Charter. It commits the parties to settle all outstanding questions by "peaceful means only through talks" and to consult together to devise "joint measures" for the peaceful settlement of differences.

2. The draft treaty is the second Soviet move in the field of "partial disarmament" measures since the Geneva talks resumed on 12 February. At the opening session, Kuznetsov submitted a draft declaration on the prohibition of nuclear military bases on foreign territory. The Russians have portrayed these measures as steps toward reducing the danger of a nuclear war without waiting for a general disarmament agreement. In addition to these two "tension reducing" proposals, Kuznetsov has suggested that the conference should discuss nuclear-free zones throughout the world. The USSR, therefore, can be expected to revive the Rapacki Plan and other similar schemes in the near future.

3. These "partial" measures are intended to enable the Soviets to hold the initiative at Geneva while they are stalling on the vital nuclear test ban question. The Russians are playing for time in the belief that the other delegations, particularly the eight neutrals, will increase pressure on the US to reduce its requirements for a test ban agreement. It is probable, moreover, that this Soviet emphasis on

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essentially propagandistic proposals reflected Khrushchev's desire to postpone any further moves or decisions in regard to a test ban until he had received the US response to the Soviet initiative on resuming bilateral talks on Berlin.

4. The introduction of the nonaggression pact at Geneva does not appear to signal a shift in Moscow's attitude toward a new round on Berlin. A nonaggression treaty was discussed in the bilateral exchanges last year as one of the ingredients in a "package" agreement on Berlin. An agreement to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons was also discussed in this context and it is significant that Moscow has so far respected the private agreement with the US to exclude this question from the Geneva disarmament debate. In the first week of the current session, Kuznetsov again agreed with Mr. Foster that the non-proliferation issue should not be raised at Geneva while it is being explored "elsewhere," i.e. in bilateral US-Soviet exchanges. This restraint probably reflects both the Soviet leaders' awareness of the delicate political implications of this issue, particularly in their relations with China, and their desire to avoid propaganda exploitation which might jeopardize prospects for including a non-proliferation understanding in a possible Berlin settlement. Khrushchev may feel he has a better chance of obtaining a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers than an agreement creating nuclear-free zones. Moreover, he probably regards a non-proliferation agreement as the most effective means of preventing West Germany from acquiring a nuclear capability.

5. The move on a nonaggression treaty at Geneva will not prevent the Russians from reviving this issue in a new round of US-Soviet Berlin talks. They probably feel they are in a good position to press this scheme in any forum in view of President Kennedy's statement, in the exchange with Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis, that "we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals" concerning a "detente" between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

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